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HYBRID DISPUTE RESOLUTION BEYOND THE BELT
AND ROAD: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN OF CHINESE ARBMED(-ARB) AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
Weixia Gu †
Abstract:
Arb-med is a form of hybrid dispute resolution that combines an adjudicative
approach (arbitration) with a non-adjudicative approach (mediation). Dispute resolution clauses
requiring arb-med will assume a popular role in resolving disputes that arise under China’s Belt and
Road Initiative. This article argues that China should regulate arb-med in a way to reconcile local
practices (mediation) with international expectations (arbitration) in context of the BRI. As an
economic bloc proposed by China, the BRI development has the potential to promote dispute
resolution means with Chinese characteristics such as arb-med. Global comparative study of
leading arbitration jurisdictions in the East and the West shows a heightened awareness of arb-med
due process concerns regarding international enforcement of arb-med awards. Most recent reforms
on arb-med by leading Chinese arbitration institutions, such as the CIETAC, BAC and SCIA,
evidence a trend toward bifurcating the two processes when facing international clients. China is
aware of procedural justice in the hybrid dispute resolution. The establishment of the China
International Commercial Court (“CICC”), and its creation of the “One-Stop” Platform shows the
need to attract foreign parties, in addition to merely Chinese ones, and the pressure to compete in
the BRI dispute resolution market. These are the leading factors that drive Chinese regulators to
look beyond sociopolitical imperatives and cultural boundaries in promoting arb-med outside of the
Belt and Road. As China is anticipated to propel the BRI arbitration system, Chinese arb-med, and
its unique process, will remain a fluid area of localized globalism in contrast with globalized
localism in China-led BRI dispute resolution development.
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INTRODUCTION PART

I.

Arb-med is a form of hybrid dispute resolution that combines an
adjudicative approach (i.e., arbitration) with a non-adjudicative approach
(i.e., mediation). During arb-med, the arbitration and mediation 1 stages are
carried out by the same person in sequence. A typical arb-med proceeding
arises when the parties have entered into arbitration and, within that
arbitration procedure, decide to mediate. If and when mediation fails,
arbitration resumes under the same mediator-turned-arbitrator(s), and an
award is rendered. Dispute resolution clauses requiring arb-med will assume,
as this article argues, a popular role in resolving disputes that arise under
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). But what are the reasons and
perceived advantages of arb-med that are propelling increased reliance on
the same? More importantly, given the due process concerns over hybrid
arbitration and mediation procedures in China,2 how can arb-med be
effectively deployed in BRI cross-border disputes without compromising
considerations of due process, justice, and efficiency? These issues warrant a
systematic study of Chinese arb-med, especially in the context of China’s
leadership of BRI development and its norm-setting capabilities 3 through the
BRI. 4
What makes arb-med particularly worth studying is not only that it is
a hybrid process, but also that it requires the neutral to assume multiple roles
that have incompatible aims and serve contradictory functions. Therefore,
arb-med is particularly vulnerable to poor dispute-resolution system design.
The popularity and success of establishing an arb-med system with
fair procedures varies among individual jurisdictions. Arb-med in China is
particularly problematic. Jurisdictions with established arb-med systems in
their domestic and cross-border transactions, such as Australia, have had few
issues with arb-med. In some Western jurisdictions, such as the United

1

Chinese law and rules of Chinese arbitration institutions translate the Chinese term of mediation
(tiaojie) as “conciliation.” They are used interchangeably. See Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: MedArb and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial
Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 152 (2004).
2
See Carlos de Vera, supra note 1, at 185–187; Weixia Gu, The Delicate Art of Med-Arb and Its
Future Institutionalisation in China, 31 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 97, 102–110 (2014).
3
Zheng Sophia Tang, “The Belt and Road” and Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation, 49 HONG
KONG L.J. 121, 129–131 (2019). Indeed, one of the core tenants of the BRI strategy is the harmonization of
the rules to increase predictability of transnational commerce and to reduce costs.
4
Id., at 122.
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States, combinations of arbitration and mediation are controversial largely
because the potential for conflicts of interest in such hybrid processes is seen
to be too great to overcome. The controversy has limited the popularity of
arb-med in these jurisdictions. Due process concerns have not prevented arbmed from gaining popularity in Asia, however, where mediation is strongly
rooted in its legal and dispute resolution culture. To prevent arb-med from
standing at odds with due process and justice concerns, Japan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore—among others in Asia—have recently enacted provisions
implementing proper procedural standards for arb-med proceedings. 5 China,
where arb-med is widely used in commercial dispute resolution, however,
lacks regulatory governance in this area.6 As such, Chinese arb-med has
been challenged, and its practice questioned, over whether it is compatible
with procedural justice.
This article focuses on the issues surrounding the resumption of
arbitration after the mediation stage and how it is perceived and used in
China. In particular, it highlights the procedural difficulties brought about by
the Chinese approach to mediation, how these difficulties might prevent
parties from adopting arb-med for cross-border disputes, and what China has
done and is doing to address procedural concerns to promote greater
adoption of arb-med in the context of its ambitious BRI development.
Structurally, this article is organized as follows. Following the
Introduction, Part II first discusses the definition of arb-med at the
conceptual level. Part III then considers why arb-med is popular in China
and how the process is perceived in practice. Part IV studies the procedural
concerns that plague the existing Chinese arb-med practice. These concerns
include the conflicting roles of the neutral, who “switches hats” from being
an arbitrator to a mediator and back, and their challenge of confidentiality.
Part V analyzes the regulatory problems of arb-med in China and how China
has attempted to mitigate those due process concerns. Market-based
regulatory competition among hundreds of Chinese arbitration institutions
and their needs to internationalize, and reach out to foreign users, are
identified as having caused Chinese arb-med to flourish and develop from a
bottom-up institutional aspect. Part VI examines the global experiences in

5

MICHAEL PRYLES & VERONICA L. TAYLOR, The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 15–17 (Michael Pryles ed., 3d ed. 2006).
6
See Paul E. Mason, Follow-Up Note to ‘The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator’
(2011), J. Int. Arb. 6, 541 et seq., 29 J. INT’L ARB. 225, 225 (2012).
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regulating arb-med. Among the jurisdictions investigated, Singapore in Asia,
Germany in continental Europe, and Australia in the Pacific are of particular
relevance to China; the experiences of these jurisdictions have already
impacted some rule reform of the most influential Chinese arbitration
institutions. Part VII argues that the BRI has led China to consider new
initiatives to promote the use of and confidence in Chinese arbitration. In
particular, the recently established Chinese International Commercial Court
(“CICC”) has set up a One-Stop Multi-tier Dispute Resolution Platform (the
“One-Stop” Platform), with the promotion of arb-med as one of its top
priorities. Leading Chinese international arbitration institutions designated
by the CICC’s “One-Stop” Platform are increasingly seen as norm-setters to
address the procedural difficulties of Chinese arb-med in the cross-border
BRI dispute resolution setting that has been left out of China’s Arbitration
Law. Finally, Part VIII concludes that the development of arb-med, and its
unique process in China, will remain a fluid area of localized globalism in
contrast with globalized localism in China-led BRI dispute resolution
development.
II.

TERMINOLOGY

This section clarifies the usage of terminology. It serves three
purposes. First, it argues against using any sort of term with “arb” and
“med” hyphenated, in various orders, to describe the hybrid dispute
resolution process because of the potential for confusion. Second, it specifies
that the use of “med-arb” and “arb-med” in this article will assume that the
order of the procedures is what is reflected by the order of the hyphenated
words. Third, it clarifies that “arb-med” in this article should be understood
to mean “arb-med-arb.”
Conceptually, definitional analysis of arb-med is necessary due to the
inconsistent use of “arb-med,” “med-arb,” and “arb-med-arb” in legal
scholarship. Interpreted literally, these three terms refer to the order in which
arbitration and mediation stages take place. “Med-arb” and “arb-med” are
thus not used interchangeably. 7 The confusion sets in when “med-arb” is

7

Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The New Arbitration, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 86
(2012); Jacob Rossof, Hybrid Efficiency in Arbitration: Waiving Potential Conflicts for Dual Role
Arbitrators in Med-Arb and Arb-Med Proceedings, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 89, 89 (2009) (med-arb and arb-med
distinguished).
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more often used in literature as an umbrella term for any form of hybrid
process involving arbitration and mediation. 8
I propose that references to any combination of arbitration and
mediation should not be made using the above terms, as the “stage dash
stage” naming already implies a certain order in which the stages should be
conducted. Such naming allows us to discuss various variants of hybrid
processes involving arbitration and mediation together without conflating
them and should remain exclusive to specific forms of arbitration-mediation
combinations. Whatever term the field will settle on for this umbrella
meaning, be it “combination of arbitration and mediation” or “hybrid
arbitration and mediation”, it should not imply any order at which the
respective stages are to be conducted as with the current scheme.
With the umbrella concept settled, discussion must turn to the
meanings of “arb-med,” “med-arb,” and “arb-med-arb.” Each of these terms
is, for their namesakes, some form of a dispute resolution procedure that
combines arbitration and mediation. 9 Arbitration and mediation are
performed sequentially in the order described. While hybrid procedures can
be performed with multiple neutrals across stages, each of these processes
referred to in this article is only performed by the same neutral. 10 In “medarb,” the parties attempt to mediate from the outset of their dispute, and then
enter arbitration proceedings for unsuccessful mediation or their remaining
unresolved issues or matters.
By contrast, “arb-med” and “arb-med-arb” require more nuance.
Nottage and Garnett, authors of definitive arbitration and mediation
scholarship, prefer that the combined procedure begins as an arbitration, not
a mediation. And if it starts as a mediation that succeeds, there is logically
no further dispute or difference capable of triggering arbitration, and hence

8

“Med-arb” is used as an umbrella term in, among others, Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P.
Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights Into The Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B.
ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 9 (2014); Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 157, 204 (2015); Carol A. Ludington, Med-Arb: If the Parties Agree,
5 Y.B. ON INT'L ARB. 313, 314 (2017).
9
Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS, 421, 421 (A.W. Rovine Ed.,
2010).
10
See Bobette Wolski, ARB-MED-ARB (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less than, Not Greater than,
the Sum of Its Parts, 6 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 249, 258–260 (2013).
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capable of generating an enforceable arbitral award.11 The procedure in
Nottage and Garnett’s description is more accurately described as “arb-medarb.” Parties using “arb-med-arb” engage in arbitration from the outset and
then, in the course of arbitration, decide to have the arbitrator settle the
subject matter through mediation and, based on the parties’ wishes, the
applicable arbitration rules or lex arbitri. The arbitration stage is then stayed,
and the same arbitrator proceeds to act as a mediator, subject to arbitration
rules governing such mediation. There are two scenarios in which the second
arbitration stage may arise. The first scenario is when mediation is entirely
successful and a full settlement has been reached. The mediator will then
become an arbitrator solely for the purpose of issuing an arbitral award in
accordance with the settlement, i.e., the consent award.12 The second
scenario is when mediation efforts are futile or the parties only reach partial
settlement. Then, a substantive arbitration hearing will be re-conducted for
the remaining matters. The resulting award will be rendered on the basis of
the partially settled outcome and the second arbitration proceeding. In both
scenarios, the arbitrator ceases to act in their capacity as a mediator and
resumes the role of arbitrator for the last stage.
It is helpful to also clarify that “arb-med” in the literal sense does not
exist. “Arb-med” does not tend to occur in real practice because a final stage
of arbitration must occur to render the award once mediation has ended. In a
literal sense, “arb-med” is a process where the parties have opted for
arbitration and then agreed to resort to mediation, often to preserve a more
harmonious relationship. But given parties who have opted for arbitration
from the outset, with the expectation of enjoying the robust global
enforceability of arbitration outcomes, it is quite unreasonable that parties
would opt for a settlement at the end. Therefore, “arb-med” in actuality
refers to “arb-med-arb” processes, where a last arbitration stage will occur
either to render a consent award or to render an award after unsettled issues
have been ruled on. As such, strictly speaking, and because it is unlikely that
“arb-med” might exist, this article uses “arb-med” to mean “arb-med-arb”
processes. In other words, “arb-med” and “arb-med-arb” in the present
article are interchangeable.

11
Luke Nottage & Richard Garnett, The Top 20 Things to Change in or around Australia’s
International Arbitration Act, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA 149, 179 n.2 (Luke Nottage
& Richard Garnett eds., 2010).
12
Tai-Heng Cheng & Anthony Kohtio, Some Limits To Apply Chinese Med-Arb Internationally, 2
N.Y. DISP. RESOL. 95, 95 (2009).
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While reliable statistics on arb-med are difficult to find, arb-med may
be present in nearly half of the arbitrations in China.
Arbitration in China is increasing. In 2017 alone, 239,360 cases were
processed by the 253 arbitration institutions in China.13 Compared to 2016,
arbitration caseload increased by 15%. 14 China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), China’s leading arbitration
institution by caseload—which includes a sizeable portion of all
international commercial arbitration in China—handled 2,370 cases or 1%
of total arbitration cases in China in 2017.15
As for cases where arb-med may be concerned, as of 2001, about 20–
30% of CIETAC arbitration cases were withdrawn after settlement or
arbitration was concluded on the basis of a settlement agreement.16 CIETAC
reported in 2014 that 21.61% of its foreign-related cases were resolved
through mediation.17
Data on arb-med adoption in China in general is lacking. However,
since September 2015, CIETAC and the China Academy of Arbitration Law
have been compiling and publishing statistics on arbitration cases concluded
by mediation in the preceding year, i.e., cases concluded by mediation, or
cases of consent awards. 18 In 2018, 26% of the arbitration cases in China
were concluded through mediation (i.e., 26% of the awards rendered in
China in 2018 were consent awards).19 Despite the steady increase of the

13

See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2017) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2017)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017)] 1, 8 (2017).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
WANG SHENGCHANG (王生长), ZHONG CAI YU TIAO JIE XIANG JIE HE DE LI LUN YU SHI WU
(仲裁与调解相结合的理论与实务) [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMBINING ARBITRATION WITH
CONCILIATION] 1, 83 (2001).
17
See CHINA ACAD. OF ARB. LAW, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2014) 1, 50 (2014).
18
The data of the previous year is only available in the September publication of the current year.
19
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI NIAN DU
BAO GAO (2018-2019) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2018-2019) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2018-2019)] 6, 7 (2018-2019).
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overall number of the arbitration cases concluded through mediation, its
ratio among all arbitration cases was down from 29% in 2017, 20 58% in
2016, 21 41% in 2015, 22 and 65% in 2014.23 Although caseload data of
Chinese arbitration concluded through mediation is more available recently,
there is insufficient data to demonstrate the overall adoption of arb-med in
China. Even so, the average percentage of cases in which consent awards
were given (i.e., the overall ratio of successful arb-med) could be as high as
47.07% (see Table 1 below). The data do not include those cases where
mediation attempts were futile, i.e., where mediation was adopted in the
arbitration process but for various reasons did not lead to a consent award.
As such, the overall adoption rate of arb-med in China could only be higher
than 47.07%.
Table 1: Arb-Med Statistics in China in Recent Years24
Year

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Average

Total Number of Arbitration Cases

113,660

136,924

208,545

239,360

539,542

247,606

Number of Arbitration Cases
Concluded by Mediation (i.e., by
Consent Award)

74,200

56,659

121,527

69,450

140,281

92,441

65%

41%

58%

29%

26%

47.07%

Percentage of Arbitration Cases
Concluded by Successful Mediation
(i.e., by Consent Award)

20

CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 13.
21
See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2016) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2016)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016)] 13 (2016).
22
See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2015) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2015)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2015)] 9 (2015).
23
Id.
24
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2018-2019), supra note 19, at 3, 6-7. CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N,
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 8, 13;
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016), supra note 21, at 8, 13; CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N,
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2015), supra note 22, at 8-9.
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Perception of Arb-Med

Arb-med as used in international disputes has an additional
international dimension not found in arb-med as used in domestic contexts.
In many ways, arb-med adds an international dimension (i.e., arbitration) to
the local product (i.e., mediation).25 Through cross-border arb-med, foreign
parties are not only exposed to Chinese mediation, but also to the practices
of Chinese-style arbitrators and arbitration institutions. These practices are
sometimes too lax and do not square well with international arbitration
standards. The Hong Kong case of Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye, which concerns
the use of hybrid dispute resolution to resolve a share transfer dispute, is a
typical example of how Chinese arb-med can potentially frustrate the
international enforcement of an award tainted by apparent bias. 26 Although
the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong overturned the appellate and enforced the
award, Keeneye demonstrates that foreign courts of enforcement may not
readily accept the arb-med procedural standards deemed acceptable to a
Chinese supervisory court.27
To understand the mediation stage within arb-med, arbitral institutions
should consider how mediation is practiced domestically in China as an
independent dispute resolution method. Mediation conducted outside arbmed (e.g., in judicial mediation and mediation by the People’s Mediation
Committees) contributes to how arbitration institutions think about the
proper standard of mediation when designing and conducting their mediation
stage of arb-med.
The Chinese approach to mediation has followed the trend of general
mediation by adopting certain features of arbitration. These include
adversarial advocacy, adjudication by a neutral, and the neutral attempting to

25

Weixia Gu, When Local Meets International: Mediation Combined with Arbitration in China and
Its Prospective Reform in a Comparative Context, 10 J. COMP. L. 84, 84 (2016) (arguing that, while
mediation is more culture-laden and jurisdiction-specific, arbitration has largely been harmonized
internationally due to the successful efforts by the international legal instruments in the field such as the
New York Convention (1958), the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985, amended in 2006), and the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (1976, amended in 2010 and 2013)).
26
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 650–60 (C.A).
27
See generally Weixia Gu & Xianchu Zhang, The Keeneye Case: Rethinking the Content of Public
Policy in Cross-border Arbitration between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 1001
(2012) (in which I argue that, due to the handover of Hong Kong to China under the “one country, two
systems” dynamic, Hong Kong courts are more likely to defer to court findings by Mainland Chinese courts
than other foreign courts).
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steer a mediation proceeding to lead to a certain outcome. 28 While this
development is not unique to China, Chinese mediation is noted to be more
“adjudicatory, aggressive, and interventionist.”29 Some practitioners have
commented that parties are forced into mediation during arbitration, and
some lawyers are even “gaming” mediation to intentionally delay the
proceedings and seek more information from the other party. 30 Reflections of
Chinese uniqueness, however, are in the courts, where parties often enter
into judicial mediation under pressure from the presiding judges.31 Judges
are in turn under pressure to settle cases through mediation to reach
performance targets. The policy imperative for judges to encourage
mandatory mediation has made reliance on mediation an institutional
outcome, which sustains a culture of mediation.32
In the context of arb-med, this mediation culture translates into more
active arb-med management by arbitrators. Fan, author of empirical study of
arbitrators acting as mediators in China, conducted a survey of 36 active
arbitrators from CIETAC, Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC”), and
Wuhan Arbitration Commission (“WAC”) taken between 2011 and 2012
showing a glimpse of arbitrator attitudes towards arb-med and how such
attitudes have affected the use of arb-med. 33 According to Fan’s study, 50%
of the respondents have recommended the parties to mediate in more than
90% of the cases in which they acted as an arbitrator; 34 more than 10% of
the respondents have recommended mediation in more than 70–90% of the
cases they arbitrated. 35
As for parties to disputes, Fan’s survey shows that where both sides
are Chinese, the parties are more likely to consent to arb-med than when
foreign parties are involved.36 The survey also shows the reasons that the

28

Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 63.
Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice
Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 33, 25, 33
(2011).
30
Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., East Meets West: An International Dialogue on Mediation and MedArb in the United States and China, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 379, 395–96 (2009).
31
Fu & Cullen, supra note 29, at 33.
32
Id.
33
Kun Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, 15 CARDOZO J. CONF.
RESOL. 777, 791 (2014).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 792.
29
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respondents choose to adopt a conciliatory role. Most respondents believed
that “the agreed outcome is easier to be voluntarily enforced than a decided
outcome in an arbitral award.”37 The second and third cited reasons are that
arb-med can reduce costs and improve efficiency and that mediation respects
the free will and voluntariness of the parties. 38
Compared to arbitration, mediation is more culture-laden and less
judicialized. Mediation’s dependency on culture is a result of its aim of
inducing voluntary settlement by the parties, and appealing to the cultural
backgrounds of the parties is a way of achieving this aim. Arbitration, by
contrast, is governed by international rules and norms developed through the
deliberations between potential users and regulators of various jurisdictions.
It is designed to be an international dispute resolution method. 39 In China,
mediation is a product of its Confucian legal culture and the State
governance imperative to promote social harmony. Confucianism favors less
contentious means of resolving disputes with an emphasis on mediation, and
views more contentious means such as litigation and arbitration to be less
conducive to the maintenance of social harmony as predefined and
constructed by the relationship between the individual and the community. 40
While the ends are the same, the State governance justification to promote
mediation is more instrumentalist. Mediation is used to promote better
governability of civil society and to reduce visible and publicized conflicts
that might potentially reduce the legitimacy of the Party-State. It was not
until the enactment of the Civil Procedure Law (1991) that cases were not
required to be mediated before adjudication by China’s People’s Courts
when the former had failed.41 Mediation is designed, therefore, to meet the
Confucian culture and State governance objectives of dispute resolution in
China. As a result, foreign users may find Chinese mediation alien during
arb-med processes.
C.

Culture and Sociopolitics as Drivers of Arb-Med Popularity

The State has made it very visible that it supports arb-med and the
Arbitration Law has mandated all Chinese arbitration institutions to provide

37

Id. at 790.
Id.
39
WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: THE REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
PRACTICAL ISSUES 3–5 (2012).
40
Id. at 32–34.
41
Xianchu Zhang, Rethinking the Mediation Campaign, 10 J. COMP. L. 44, 45 (2015).
38
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arb-med in domestic and cross-border arbitration when the parties have
requested it.42 But what are the driving factors for arb-med’s popularity in
China? The original design of China’s Arbitration Law, including the
requirement that all arbitration institutions must offer arb-med, could be
influenced by Chinese sociopolitical needs and Confucian traditions of
social harmony.
1.

Confucian Culture

Attributing the success of arb-med to the Confucian tradition for
harmony is a trope in Chinese arbitration scholarship.43 This argument
suggests that Chinese culture favors virtues (li) over rules or law (fa) of the
Legalist tradition. Virtues, unlike harsh laws, induce benevolence between
predefined social relations that prevent conflict between social actors.44
Social actors are discouraged from actively asserting their rights and
interests if others default their obligations.45 Legal actors are only
individuals in the context of social relations. In dispute resolution, therefore,
this translates into a preference for more amicable, less adversarial
processes. Thus, under Confucian legal thought, mediation is encouraged
over litigation and arbitration to prevent societal contention and the collapse
of social relations.
Before assessing the validity of this argument on arb-med’s
popularity, cultural analysis of legal practice and norms warrants a caveat:
this mode of analysis might fall victim to reductionism. It might be more
accurate and useful to attribute the differences in practice between
jurisdictions beyond references to cultural and traditional stereotypes. These
stereotypes become less valid when parties appoint personnel from multiple
legal cultures (such as appointing foreign counsel or arbitrators) and when
arbitration institutions attempt to internationalize by adopting more widely
accepted dispute resolution norms. 46 China may allow arb-med with the
same personnel, but that does not mean East Asian jurisdictions in general

42
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have less respect for due process. Japan, for instance, has taken greater steps
than China to avoid due process issues while preserving arb-med as a
popular means of dispute resolution. The Japanese Arbitration Law, unlike
the Chinese Arbitration Law, stipulates that the neutral can only play the
dual role of mediator and arbitrator if both parties have consented in writing,
and the dual capacities must end when any one party withdraws such written
consent. 47 Such level of protection against irregularities is only afforded by
rules of some individual arbitration institutions in China rather than the
Chinese Arbitration Law as a whole. Thus, it is too reductionist to conclude
that a Confucian legal culture is responsible for less respect toward due
process safeguards in Chinese arb-med.
This caveat does not mean all cultural analyses are futile. Despite that
the behavior of Chinese parties and practices of Chinese arbitration
institutions involved in cross-border arbitration can be seen as products of
multiple legal traditions, the practices of arbitration and arb-med promoted
by the Chinese government are distinctively Chinese. Cultural analyses are
perhaps more accurately tailored as legal-political analyses that are
influenced by traditional culture. After all, the way culture manifests itself in
legal norms is largely shaped by the legal and political institutions that
implement legal norms.
2.

Sociopolitical Imperative

In China, the “design from the top” (dingceng sheji 顶层设计)—to
use a policy buzzword used by today’s Chinese Central Government to
promote judicial reform—may be inspired by foreign trends, but legal
reformers are very clear that such trends are specifically selected to reflect
the needs of China and the BRI development. Indeed, one of the five basic
principles expressed in the Supreme People’s Court’s Diversified Dispute
Resolution Opinion is that the “diversified dispute resolution system with
Chinese characteristics” must be perfected by “basing it on the
circumstances of the nation, reasonable adoption [of foreign experiences].” 48

Chūsaihō [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 38 (Japan), translated at
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This exercise of selecting what international arbitration norms to
adopt in China reflects that Chinese reformers cannot breach certain norms
entrenched in domestic sociopolitical context. As more Chinese companies
are investing in foreign countries, China is also taking reference from other
jurisdictions when designing its own dispute resolution systems. The China
International Commercial Court (“CICC”), for example, is inspired by other
commercial courts around the world such as the Singapore International
Commercial Court.49 Singapore’s arrangement setting its commercial court
within its highest court likely also inspired the CICC’s position and linkage
within the Chinese Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), as CICC is an integral
part of China’s SPC.
But it is unlikely that China will adopt international norms beyond its
political mandate, even when it might reconcile differences in legal norms
among Belt and Road jurisdictions one day in the future. These constraints
exist in spite of China’s attempts to internationalize. This is apparent from
SPC Justice Gao Xiaoli’s interview regarding the CICC. She noted that other
commercial courts have foreign judges and have judgments in English
despite it not being an official language of the country. 50 These are areas
where China would find it hard to change, even when the Chinese legislature
has the legal power to remove such barriers by amending the Organic Law
of the People’s Courts, the Judges’ Law, the Arbitration Law, and the Civil
Procedure Law.
But there is no indication of this potential internationalization from
the legislative comments on the draft of the Arbitration Law in 1994.51
Instead, the comments focused on attributes of arbitration that would be a
feature of “Western law.” Indeed, the comments stated that the consultation

Dispute Resolution Mechanism] (Court Issuance No. 14 of 2016) (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 28,
2016, effective June 28, 2016), CLI.3.273230 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
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(打造国际商事法庭，司法保障“一带一路”建设—
专访最高人民法院民事审判第四庭副庭长高晓力) [Creating the International Commercial Court, Legal
Protection for the Belt & Road Construction—Interview with Gao Xiaoli, Deputy Chief Justice of the
Fourth Division of Civil Trial of the Supreme People's Court], RENMIN FAZHI (人民法治) [THE RULE OF
LAW OF THE PEOPLE] (Feb. 10, 2018), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wwM5Obhz069STbeJ73oMdA.
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draft was written “on the basis of consolidated working experience of
arbitration, on the basis of the need to construct a socialist market economic
system” 52 and referenced “the valuable experiences of foreign arbitration
systems and international norms.” 53 Besides the need to construct a socialist
market, the documented legislative intent does not indicate any need to base
China’s arbitration rules on Confucian values. Even when one argues that
social harmony is an embedded feature of a socialist market system, the
comments manifest social harmony through economic language.
Thus, contemporary cross-border arbitration norms are primarily
shaped by the need to attract foreign parties and investors to use Chinese
arbitration services. Where there is no such demand, as in domestic
arbitration, developments and reforms lag behind. Some measures first
implemented in “foreign-related” arbitration were eventually applied to
domestic arbitration, but reforms to domestic arbitration were conducted to
make arbitration regulations more consistent within China and to reflect the
SPC’s pro-arbitration judicial position.
The design of arbitration law, norms, and institutions has affected how
arbitrators approach arbitration and arb-med. In Fan’s survey referred to
above, the arbitrator respondents who believe arb-med to be appropriate
(88.1% of all respondents) chose ease of enforcement of settlement
compared to award, advantages in costs and efficiency, and respect to party
free will and voluntariness as the primary reasons for conducting arb-med.54
These reasons are mostly technical and related to the efficiency of dispute
resolution rather than cultural factors.
Only a few of such respondents (6 out of 32) stated that traditional
Chinese culture has influenced them to conduct arb-med, 55 and only one
respondent said “mediation reflects the local culture in China and therefore
is more easily accepted by the Chinese.”56 Though not representative, this
respondent’s response reflects how culture can manifest itself through the
advantage of dispute resolution efficiency without being an influence on arbmed practices in China per se. However, a more interesting point these six
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respondents have shown is that domestic legal culture can spill over to
influence how cross-border dispute resolution is conducted.
Chinese arbitration institutions and practitioners are conscious of this
spill-over effect. CIETAC, for example, has added a provision in its 2015
Rules expressly allowing independent mediation during arb-med with the
consent of both parties to address the concerns of “parties and arbitration
professionals with western culture background [who] are concerned with or
even skeptical of the process in which arbitrators act as mediators at the
same time.” 57 Practitioners have expressed that arb-med is noticeably more
popular among Chinese users than those from elsewhere.58
Although there is some spillover of domestic legal culture to crossborder arbitration, arb-med is not positioned by institutional design as a
replacement of hybrid arbitration-mediation by different neutrals or even
institutions. As Chinese arbitration institutions and State judicial institutions
internationalize and reach out to foreign users, the influence of domestic
culture is expected to wane. But as the establishment of the CICC has
demonstrated, when domestic culture is necessary for the State to achieve
certain legal-political norms, the domestic culture is most likely preserved.
One solution, which leading arbitration institutions have discovered, is to
make explicit the autonomy that parties have to choose whether to use arbmed—hence satisfying the needs of both Chinese and Western parties.
Nonetheless, arb-med in China is not only an area where domestic and
international norms co-exist, but they display increasing tension.
IV.

PROCEDURAL DEFECTS OF CHINESE-STYLED ARB-MED

While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese arbitration
institutions to “go abroad” (zou chuqu) and compete with regional
institutions, the chronic problem with arb-med procedural defects remains
unresolved. This is in spite of the frequent and recent revisions to rules of
various Chinese arbitration institutions. Few have fundamentally addressed
procedural irregularities embedded in the arb-med system long identified by
scholars and practitioners, leaving the usual defects of actual and apparent
bias and protection of confidentiality largely unaddressed.
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Conflicting Roles of Arbitrator and Mediator

The main criticism of arb-med is the conflict of interest between the
arbitral and mediatory roles assumed by the neutral. The concern is whether
the neutral can remain impartial given the different approaches and attitudes
required for the two dispute resolution methods. It is the norm in China for
the arbitrator to “switch hats” and become the mediator when mediation
occurs within the arbitration proceedings. In such case, arbitration is stayed
and is resumed only when mediation fails.
A source of the conflict of roles is how arbitrators, as opposed to
mediators, should conduct themselves in the course of the proceedings. In
the proceedings, the arbitrator takes on the role that decides on an
appropriate award, based on the merits of the submissions from both parties.
It is a legal process in which the arbitrator must interpret relevant laws and
apply them to facts, just as a judge would do in a court. 59 The mediator, by
contrast, does not inquire into the appropriateness of a settlement reached by
the parties. Instead, the mediator is more interested in having the parties
reach a settlement agreement developed on their own.
Because of the very different aims of the two forms of dispute
resolution, the approach required of the neutral must not be the same in all
stages of arb-med. A competent arbitrator should be disinterested and display
a “judicial temperament.” 60 She must observe the requirements of
impartiality and general legal competence from which she draws respect
from the party. 61 A good mediator by contrast should be sensitive to interparty relationships and to discover the needs of the parties that might hide
below mediatory exchanges, or the parties’ opposing positions. In facilitating
settlement and communication between the parties, the mediator may take a
more involved, personal approach. When practiced separately as single-tier
dispute resolution methods, even for the same subject matter, the dispute
resolution process generally has no due process concerns. Theoretically, an
arbitration proceeding can suffer no irregularities or biases, actual or
apparent, when the same person switches between arbitrator and mediator if
she can maintain the standards required of her in arbitration and mediation
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respectively. Due process concerns do not arise from hybrid resolutions per
se but from the very human difficulty of partitioning information obtained in
the two stages to ensure impartiality.
China’s Arbitration Law is silent on whether the parties can request
third-party mediation from an independent mediator. 62 But the mediatory
role of the arbitrators is generally assumed as a matter of practice. The arbmed rules of leading Chinese arbitration institutions with experience in
cross-border arbitration, such as CIETAC, BAC, Shanghai International
Arbitration Center (“SHIAC”) and Shenzhen Court of International
Arbitration (“SCIA”), also reflect this assumption.63 The 2015 CIETAC
Rules, for instance, state that “[w]ith the consents of both parties, the arbitral
tribunal may [mediate] the case in a manner it considers appropriate.”64 The
rule empowers the tribunal to conduct mediation but is silent on whether
third parties can also mediate. It has been reported that CIETAC assembled
an independent panel of mediators on the request of a party in one case.65
The 2015 CIETAC Rules attempt to provide non-CIETAC mediation, but it
only vaguely provides that “CIETAC may, with the consents of both parties,
assist the parties to conciliate the dispute in a manner and procedure it
considers appropriate.” 66 It is unclear how the parties may be “assisted”
under this rule or what arrangements have been made under the rule.
The 2015 BAC Rules are more explicit with alternative arrangements.
They provide for independent mediation at BAC’s Mediation Center in
accordance with the BAC Mediation Center Mediation Rules. 67 But such

62
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mediation is separate from the arbitral proceedings and is thus not a form of
arb-med. As with self-settlement, parties who have reached a settlement
agreement through the Mediation Center can request the arbitration tribunal
to render an award based on that agreement,68 allowing the agreement to be
enforced in foreign jurisdictions under the New York Convention. With the
approval of the BAC Chairperson and additional costs borne by the parties,
the BAC Rules also allow international arbitrations to replace the arbitrator
after mediation fails.69 The explicit arrangement for a separate mediation
mechanism and allowing arbitrator replacement is rare among arbitration
rules in China. Similar to other rules, though, the language of the BAC rules
still does not expressly allow the possibility of mediation by independent
mediators.
Besides language in arbitration rules that tend to lead parties towards
institutional arb-med, the parties may also choose their arbitrator to mediate
because they are already familiar with the arbitrator, and the arbitrator is
familiar with the facts and background of the dispute.70 The parties can be
sure that they can trust the arbitrator. Such an arbitrator will also allow
quicker arbitration and award rendering if and when mediation fails.71
However, whether trust and the saving of time and costs do draw
parties into arb-med is dependent on the legal culture. Empirical study
shows that mutual consent for arb-med is far more likely to be given when
both parties are Chinese. 72 Presumably Chinese parties are more familiar
with the arb-med process embedded in their dispute resolution culture, while
foreign parties are less trusting of the process. Foreign parties might also
expect an award rather than a settlement agreement by the end.73
B.

Confidentiality

A thornier procedural concern has to do with the confidentiality of
information. The issue of due process arises when the neutral, such as the
mediator, reverts to becoming an arbitrator. In this process, the information
obtained by the neutral during the mediation stage might, consciously or
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otherwise, be relied on by the neutral in the subsequent arbitration stage.74
Such information would not normally be communicated to the arbitrator in
arbitration when practiced alone. Mediators who practice evaluative
mediation might also reveal to the parties the merits of their respective cases,
which would not be known to the parties in arbitration until the award is
rendered. 75
Distinct from arbitration, mediation allows ex parte communication,
or caucusing. Information given by a party to the neutral during caucuses is
not known to the other party. The other party has no opportunity to defend
against such confidential information. 76 It is for the mediator to determine
the truthfulness of the information and the extent to which that information
should influence her decision in the arbitration stage to come should
mediation fail. Parties might also use caucuses to privately influence the
neutral in the favor in the subsequent arbitration. Because mediation may
involve discussions into personal and emotional issues between the
respective parties and the mediator, the neutral may become more
sympathetic towards a particular party. 77 Admittedly, whether the parties
create bias through these interactions is dependent on the conduct of the
individual neutral. The fact that neutrals can and may be biased indicates a
gap in the regulation of arb-med. Indeed, partiality might only be known or
is apparent to parties when mediation fails, at which point it is too late to
remedy the proceedings.78
The Keeneye case in Hong Kong shows the potential dangers of
caucusing in creating bias, actual or apparent. The tribunal, of the Xi’an
Arbitration Commission (“XAC”) in China, was composed of a presiding
arbitrator and two arbitrators nominated respectively by each side.79 After
the first hearing, the tribunal suggested mediation to the parties, and lawyers
on both sides expressed their consent to the arbitrators attempting to resolve
the matter as mediators.80 The tribunal also, on its own initiative, proposed
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that the respondents pay the claimants RMB 250 million as settlement. 81 The
tribunal then appointed XAC’s Secretary-General and the claimantnominated arbitrator as mediators and informed the parties of this
proposal.82 The Secretary-General and the claimant-nominated arbitrator
contacted a person, who described himself as “a person related to (or
affiliated with)” 83 (guanxiren 关系人) the respondents. According to the
XAC Rules, “[w]ith the approval of the parties, any third party may be
invited to assist the mediation, or they may act as the mediator.” 84 The
Secretary-General and the claimant-nominated arbitrator asked him to a
private meeting at a restaurant in the Xi’an Shangri-La Hotel. 85 At the
meeting, the Secretary-General asked the respondents’ affiliate to “work on”
(zuogongzuo 做工作) the respondents, which is understood to mean to get
the respondents to accept the settlement proposal.86 The respondents
nonetheless rejected the settlement proposal. 87 The arbitration tribunal
reconvened after the failed mediation and decided to award the respondents
RMB 50 million.88 The respondents challenged the award before the Xi’an
Intermediate People’s Court, but the court upheld the award. 89
The enforcement of the award was then challenged in the Hong Kong
Court of First Instance (CFI). 90 The CFI refused enforcement on the grounds
that the “wining and dining”91 meeting would “cause a fair-minded observer
to apprehend a real possibility of bias on the part of the Arbitration
Tribunal.”92 Although evidence showing actual bias was insufficient, the
interactions at the Shangri-La meeting and the contrast between the
proposed settlement and the final award were sufficient to constitute
apparent bias.93 This apprehension of bias was enough for the enforcement
of such award to contravene Hong Kong’s public policy—that is, “the most
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basic notions of justice and morality of the Hong Kong system.” 94 The judge
opined that, “[t]he risk of a mediator turned arbitrator appearing to be biased
will always be great.” 95 This decision was reversed when the party seeking
enforcement appealed. The appellate court decided to uphold the arbitral
award on the basis that the enforcement court should have given greater
weight to the decision handed down by the Xi’an Court, in the supervisory
jurisdiction in Xi’an, which found no apparent bias and held that the arbmed was properly conducted. 96
It cannot be assumed that the same standard of apparent bias and
deference applied by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal will be replicated by
foreign courts. The appellate judgment questions whether balancing the
exercise of promoting arbitration while ensuring that due process is observed
is done correctly. 97 Indeed, reviewing an arbitration and its procedures in
light of public policy at the enforcement jurisdiction level is the purpose of
the enforcement courts. If deference for the supervisory court is too readily
relied on, then public policy grounds to refuse award enforcement can only
be applied in excessively narrow circumstances. 98
Unlike those of other jurisdictions, due process safeguards in arb-med
rules are limited in China. A typical set of arbitration rules in China does not
contain provisions specifying the use of information collected from
mediation. At most, the rules only provide some safeguards that prohibit the
parties from relying on any statements expressed during the mediation stage
by the other party or the tribunal to support their case. 99 Generally, no
provision bars the tribunal from relying on information provided to them
during the mediation stage when deciding on an award afterwards. Even if
such rules did exist, they might be difficult to put into practice, since they
would require the arbitrators to keep secrets from themselves.
Nonetheless, after the initial refusal to enforce the award in Keeneye,
Chinese arbitration institutions have taken some steps to mitigate potential
procedural irregularities. CIETAC revised its rules in 2014 to expressly state
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that with the parties’ consent CIETAC may assist the parties to mediate the
dispute “in a manner and procedure it considers appropriate”100 if the parties
do not wish for mediation to be conducted by the same arbitral tribunal.101
The previous 2005 CIETAC Rules did not suggest that mediation within
arbitration can be conducted by someone other than the tribunal. The change
in the subsequent 2012 CIETAC Rules notifies the parties that mediation by
the arbitral tribunal is not the only available option. As noted above,
however, what CIETAC considers to be an appropriate manner and
procedure of mediation is unclear.
In addition, no statutory safeguards targeting caucusing are available
in Chinese law. This sets the Chinese statutory regime aside from other
jurisdictions. Hong Kong, for example, has the Arbitration Ordinance based
upon the UNCITRAL Model Law. The ordinance allows arbitrators to
assume the role of mediators so long as the parties consent and have not
withdrawn their consent in writing.102 The ordinance expressly provides for
a disclosure safeguard: if and when mediation fails, a neutral having
confidential information from a party, “must, before resuming the arbitral
proceedings, disclose to all other parties as much of that information as the
arbitrator considers is material to the arbitral proceedings.” 103 Singapore’s
International Arbitration Act has a similar safeguard provision. 104 This
safeguard requires disclosure to both parties of what information was given
to the arbitrator, and prompts the parties to defend against such information
during the arbitral proceedings.
V.

REGULATORY PROBLEMS OF ARB-MED IN CHINA

Arbitration in China is regulated by several sources of law. There are
statutes, judicial interpretations and guiding cases issued by the SPC, and
occasional regulations and circulars from the State Council. The rules of
individual arbitration institutions also govern how arb-med is practiced.
However, governance of arb-med is not well institutionalized, and a bulk of
its regulation relies on individual rules of arbitration institutions. This is one
of the reasons the procedural defects discussed above are still a pervasive
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problem when practicing arb-med in China and why parties—especially
foreign parties—are still suspicious of arb-med in China.
Statutes only play a small, but nonetheless foundational, role in
regulating arb-med. China’s Arbitration Law (2017) has had no major
amendments105 since its promulgation in 1994 and regulation of arbitration
is mainly achieved through the SPC’s judicial interpretations issued
throughout the past twenty years. Within the Arbitration Law, only Article 51
addresses arb-med but does little to define how it ought to be practiced.
However, Article 51(1) does require Chinese arbitration institutions to
provide for the procedure of arb-med:
The arbitration tribunal may first conduct mediation before
rendering an award. If the parties agree to mediation, then the
arbitration tribunal shall conduct mediation. When mediation
fails, the tribunal shall duly render an award. 106
This Article empowers all arbitration institutions in China to conduct
arb-med, and all domestic and international arbitration institutions in China
include such an arb-med clause in their arbitration rules resembling the
above statutory language. Although Article 51 requires the tribunal to respect
the intentions of the parties to mediate—to the extent that the tribunal is
required to conduct mediation when the parties so request—it does not
forbid the tribunal from conducting mediation even when a party decides
against mediation.
The issue of party consent is dealt with by arbitration rules. For
instance, CIETAC’s commercial arbitration rules (2015) and investment
arbitration rules (2017) expressly state that arb-med can only proceed with
the consent of both parties, and that mediation must end when either party
withdraws consent.107 BAC, SCIA and SHIAC have rules that stipulate the
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Commission (CIETAC) International Investment Arbitration Rules (For Trial Implementation)
(promulgated by China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (China Chamber of International
Commerce), Sept. 12, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 43 [hereinafter 2017 CIETAC International
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same. 108 In practice, Fan’s survey shows that 77.8% of arbitrator respondents
take the initiative to propose arb-med without being prompted by the
parties; 109 this suggests that arb-med is just a “matter of good practice” in
Chinese arbitration settings.110 However, the survey also found these
initiatives mainly take place during or after the main hearing in
arbitration.111 Thus, parties are likely to have the opportunity to argue their
case without entering the mediation stage.
A.

Market-Based Regulation

As an institutional arbitration dominant jurisdiction,112 China has de
facto delegated the responsibility of arbitration regulation to the market
through its 253 arbitration institutions. A danger in this regulatory approach
is the inconsistency of standards practiced by arbitrators and a lack of
safeguards available to the parties among different Chinese arbitration
institutions. Foreign investors are unlikely to arbitrate in local arbitration
institutions that do not have much experience with international disputes. It
is the institutions focusing on international disputes that are paving the way
in modernizing and standardizing Chinese arb-med regulation.
1.

Chinese Leading Arbitration Institutions’ Approach to Arb-Med

China’s leading institutions are not high in number and are
concentrated in first-tier cities. Of the 253 institutions, only 60 handled
“foreign-related” arbitration cases in 2017. 113 This number remained stable
from 2016, when 62 institutions handled “foreign-related” cases.114
According to CIETAC, only CIETAC, Guangzhou Arbitration Commission
(“GAC”) and SHIAC handled more than 100 “foreign-related” cases in

Investment
Arbitration
Rules],
available
at
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=390&l=en.
108
2015 BAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 67; 2019 SCIA Rules, supra note 63, art. 48; 2015 SHIAC
Rules, supra note 63, art. 41.
109
Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, supra note 33, at 791.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 795–96.
112
See, WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 19–24 (China does not allow ad-hoc
arbitration).
113
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 14.
114
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016), supra note 22, at 14.
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2016. 115 These numbers, however, are missing from the 2017 report. The
vast majority of Chinese arbitration institutions do not concern themselves
with cases involving a foreign party, foreign subject matter, or the
performance of obligations outside China.116 Therefore, market regulation of
arb-med, and of arbitration more generally, is shaped by only a handful of
leading Chinese arbitration institutions.
Indeed, market regulation in this sense is not a purposive exercise to
control how parties and practitioners utilize arb-med in their conflicts.
Rather, the leading institutions are constantly reviewing and revising their
arbitration rules to remain competitive in the market, 117 whereby they
indirectly promote the standard of procedural fairness in cross-border arbmed. Inter-institutional competition remains a potent force of regulating arbmed.
Of the leading Chinese arbitration institutions, the SCIA is the most
innovative in dealing with arb-med. After SCIA split from CIETAC in
2012, 118 its rules in 2016 allowed parties to international commercial
disputes, investment disputes, and disputes relating to Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan, to submit their disputes to SCIA using the Arbitration Rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) in lieu of SCIA Rules.119 Although this change was in line
with CIETAC’s 2015 Rules, which allowed hybrid arbitration clauses
specifying CIETAC arbitration using non-CIETAC arbitration rules (e.g., the
UNCITRAL Rules),120 it was the first time institutional arbitration rules in
China explicitly referred to the application of the UNCITRAL rules. The
2016 SCIA Rules introduced the “Guidelines for the Administration of

115

Id.
These are the three main circumstances where the court would deem a case to be “foreign-related.”
The SPC introduced a fourth limb to “foreign-relatedness,” where both companies were wholly-foreignowned enterprises registered in a free trade zone in Shanghai, China in 2015, in xi men zi guo ji mao yi (
shang hai ) you xian gong si yu shang hai huang jin zhi di you xian gong si shen qing cheng ren he zhi xing
wai
guo
zhong
cai
cai
jue
an
(西门子国际贸易(上海)有限公司与上海黄金置
地有限公司申请承认和执行外国仲裁裁决案) [Siemens Int’l Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai
Golden Landmark Company Limited], CLI.C.9657573(EN) (Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. Nov. 27, 2015)
(Lawinfochina) (case concerning application for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award).
117
Weixia Gu, Piercing the Veil of Arbitration Reform in China: Promises, Pitfalls, Patterns,
Prognoses, and Prospects, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 799, 826–29 (2017).
118
Id. at 821–23.
119
Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Arbitration Rules (effective Dec. 1, 2016), art.
3(4) [hereinafter 2016 SCIA Rules], available at http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_rules/939.html.
120
2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 4(3).
116
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Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (“SCIA UNCITRAL
Guidelines”), 121 which further regulate how SCIA is to apply the
UNCITRAL Rules. This means that foreign parties might opt for the
UNCITRAL Rules, with which they might be more familiar than the SCIA
Rules. This approach was confirmed in SCIA’s latest revision to its rules in
February 2019.122
With the UNCITRAL Rules, an arbitrator can be challenged “if
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence.”123 If, within 15 days from the date of the
notice of challenge, the challenged arbitrator refuses to withdraw or the
challenge is not agreed upon by all parties, then the challenging party may
elect to pursue the challenge.124 In such a case, the SCIA UNCITRAL
Guidelines specify that the SCIA President will decide on the challenge.125
But other than this provision, whether an arbitrator may also assume the role
of mediator is not mentioned. By virtue of Article 51(1) of the China
Arbitration Law, Chinese arbitration institutions are required to perform arbmed when both parties are willing and have consented to it. So, it is unclear
whether using the UNCITRAL Rules would be consistent with the Chinese
statutory requirement. Although the UNCITRIAL Arbitration Rules are
silent as to arb-med, it might be useful to consider the position of the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules on arb-med, which require the parties to
mediation to:
undertake not to initiate, during the conciliation proceedings,
any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of a dispute that is
the subject of the conciliation proceedings, except that a party
may initiate arbitral or judicial proceedings where, in his

121

Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Guidelines for the Administration of
Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (effective Dec. 1, 2016) [hereafter SCIA UNCITRAL
Guidelines], available at http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_rules/941.html.
122
2019 SCIA Rules, supra note 63, art. 3(4).
123
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2013), art. 12(1)
[hereinafter
2013
UNCITRAL
Rules],
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/uncitral-arbitration-rules-2013-e.pdf.
124
Id. art. 13(4).
125
SCIA UNCITRAL Guidelines, supra note 121, art. 7(3).
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opinion, such proceedings are necessary for preserving his
rights.126
Instead of including more detailed safeguards in its arbitration rules,
SCIA and CIETAC seem to be moving away from the Chinese-styled arbmed, despite that the fact that hybrid resolution is already deeply embedded
in Chinese arbitration culture.
Both SCIA and CIETAC have recently created mediation centers or
set up schemes to allow for mediation by mediators other than the arbitral
tribunal. SCIA has promoted what it calls “Diversified Harmonious Dispute
Resolution” (“DHDR”). 127 The term echoes an SPC opinion issued in 2016
pushing for modernization and promoting alternative dispute resolution
systems as part of China’s Fourth Five-Year Court Reform Plan. 128 In 2008,
SCIA created its mediation center to encourage mediation before and outside
of existing arbitration proceedings.129 SCIA has also since advertised a
combination of Hong Kong mediation and Shenzhen arbitration, as well as
established joint mediation arrangements under the Guangdong–Hong
Kong–Macau Great Bay Area Commercial Mediation Alliance in December
2013. 130 Likewise, most recently, CIETAC established its own mediation
center in May 2018.131

126
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (adopted July 23, 1980), art. 16
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules], http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/concrules/conc-rules-e.pdf.
127
Xiaochun Liu, Innovations of Chinese International Arbitration (2017) (presented at 6th Asia
Pacific ADR Conference).
128
Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Jin Yi Bu Shen Hua Duo Yuan Hua Jiu
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Jian
(Fa
Fa
[2016]
14
Hao)
(最高人民法院关于人民法院进一步深化多元化纠纷解决机制改革的意见) (法发 [2016] 14号)
[Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on People’s Courts Further Deepening the Reform of Diversified
Dispute Resolution Mechanism] (Court Issuance No. 14 of 2016) (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 28,
2016, effective June 28, 2016), CLI.3.273230 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
129
SCIA set up the SCIA Mediation Center in December 2008, see SHENZHEN CT. OF INT’L ARB.,
http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/mediate.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
130
See the official website at yue gang ao zhong cai tiao jie lian meng (粤港澳仲裁调解联盟)
GUANGDONG, HONG KONG & MACAU MEDIATION ALLIANCE, http://www.ghmma.com/nav/2.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2019).
131
CIETAC set up its Mediation Centre and Signed Cooperation Agreement with NEEQ on May 18,
2018. See CIETAC Set up its Mediation Centre and Signed Cooperation Agreement with NEEQ, CIETAC,
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=15407&l=en (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
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Investment Arbitration and Arb-Med

While commercial arbitration is a comparatively developed area of
Chinese arbitration, arbitration of investor-state disputes is a more recent
phenomenon in China. Again, SCIA and CIETAC are leading the
development. SCIA revised its rules in 2016 to include investor-state
disputes as one of its arbitrable matters, becoming the first Chinese
arbitration institution to do so.132 The 2016 SCIA Rules mandate that all
investment arbitrations submitted to SCIA will be governed by the readymade international benchmark in the field (i.e., the UNCITRAL Rules
applied to ad-hoc investment treaty arbitration), and subject to the SCIA
UNCITRAL Guidelines.133 But as with above, the UNCITRAL Rules are
silent on the availability of arb-med.
CIETAC, on the other hand, specially devised a set of rules for
investor-state disputes in 2017 independent of its commercial arbitration
rules.134 The regulations on arb-med, however, do not differ significantly
compared to the CIETAC general commercial arbitration rules. The
investment arbitration rules provide that, for adoption of mediation in the
arbitration process, the tribunal must obtain both parties’ consent before
proceeding to mediation, 135 and the parties may withdraw consent, causing
the mediation proceedings to end and arbitration to resume. 136
To date, SCIA, CIETAC and BAC137 are the only three arbitration
institutions in China that accept investor-state disputes. Indeed, there is
traditionally little interest in arbitrating with China as a host state for
investment or arbitrating with other host states by Chinese investors under
the ICSID Convention, which went into force in China in 1993.138 As of
March 2019, only five cases have been filed by Chinese investors against
other host states and only three cases have been filed by foreign investors

132

2016 SCIA Rules, supra note 119, art. 2(2).
Id. art. 3(5).
134
See 2017 CIETAC International Investment Arbitration Rules, supra note 107.
135
Id. art. 43(1).
136
Id. art. 43(6).
137
BAC Rules of International Investment Arbitration (effective on Oct. 1, 2019), available at
http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/data_dl/2019%E6%8A%95%E8%B5%84%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E8
%A7%84%E5%88%990905%20%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
138
Tong Qi, How Exactly Does China Consent to Investor-State Arbitration: On the First ICSID
Case against China, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 265, 268 (2012).
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against China as a host state.139 Of the five cases filed by the Chinese
investors, three were actually filed by claimants from outside mainland
China. The first case brought involved a Hong Kong resident with Chinese
nationality, 140 the second case involved Standard Chartered Bank Hong
Kong, 141 and the most recent one involved Sanum Investments, a Macanese
company. 142
As for the two concluded cases filed against China thus far, no
investors have been successful. The parties either discontinued the
proceeding 143 or the award was rendered in favor of the state party. 144An
explanation for the lack of investor-state arbitration against China is the lack
of trust between the two parties. A consultation by the European
Commission in 2011 reveals that only 40% of the European investors
surveyed would opt for investor-state arbitration against China.145 Most
would rather settle amicably and would consider arbitration for complete

139
See the official website of the ICSID database at Advanced Case Search, INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx (last visited
Mar. 13, 2019).
140
Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, ¶ 1 (July 7, 2011),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/255/tza-yap-shum-v-peru (claims
arising out of the seizure of the bank account of claimant's enterprise due to tax debt and other alleged
actions undertaken by Peruvian tax authorities resulted in the substantive deprivation of claimant's
investment).
141
Standard Chartered Bank (H.K.) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/41, Award, ¶ 2 (July 17, 2017), https://arbitration.org/award/744 (Standard Chartered initiated
proceedings against Tanzania for breaching an agreement under which Tanzania undertook against
discriminatory action and expropriation to a Tanzanian company that was to develop a power plant.
Standard Chartered acquired the loan for the power plant project).
142
See Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No.
ADHOC/17/1, (pending).
143
See Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15, Order of
Discontinuance
(May
16,
2013),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-disputesettlement/cases/427/ekran-v-china (Ekran’s subsidiary, incorporated in China, had a 70-year land lease
agreement with the Chinese provincial government in Hainan. The Hainan government revoked the
subsidiary’s leasehold eleven years after it was granted, citing a regulation on land curbing that allows the
government to retake without compensation land left undeveloped for more than two years).
144
See Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25,
Award,
¶
50
(Mar.
9,
2017),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3885/DC10053_En.pdf, 50 (Mar. 9, 2017) (Ansung entered into an
agreement with a Communist Party committee of an industrial zone in China to build a golf course, luxury
condominiums, and a clubhouse. The committee requested Ansung pay a higher price for land use and
receive a smaller area of land than initially agreed).
145
European Commission Directorate General for Trade, Summary of contributions to the European
Commission’s public consultation on “the future investment relationship between the EU and China”, 10
(2011).
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expropriation only. 146 The reluctance stems from the fear of retaliation, harm
to existing investments, and loss of potential investment opportunities.147
80% of the respondents also noted that they did not have confidence in
Chinese law to protect investor rights due to “lack of transparency and
consistency of the system which is subject to political pressure.”148
China has a history of using various means to limit the applicability of
investor protections. Consider, for example, China’s treatment of investors in
negotiating its bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”). The national treatment
clauses in the BITs include qualifying clauses that limit their applicability.149
These usually take the form of qualifying clauses that allow for derogation
based on laws and regulations of a contracting party. The Japan-China BIT
signed in 1988 prevents discriminatory treatment from being deemed as less
favorable if “in accordance with [a Contracting Party’s] laws and
regulations, to nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party, . . . it
is really necessary for the reason of public order, national security or sound
development of national economy.” 150 The necessary reasons to invoke this
grandfather clause are found in the BIT and its additional protocol.151 A
more recent BIT concluded between China and Tanzania in 2013 does not
rely on such broad grounds for derogation. National treatment clauses can
only be accorded without prejudicing the applicable laws and regulations of
the host state.152 Similar clause construction is found in the 2011 ChinaUzbekistan BIT 153 and the 2009 China-Malta BIT. 154 Although China
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China-Tanz.,
Mar.
24,
2013
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China-Tanzania
BIT],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5488/download.
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Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr. 19, 2011
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China-Uzbekistan
BIT],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/3357/download.
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continues to be reluctant to offer full national treatment protection to foreign
investors, it has made efforts to reduce the force of national treatment
qualifiers in recent BITs by committing to reduce non-conforming measures.
In the Protocol to the 2003 China-Germany BIT, for example, China
declares that it will take appropriate steps to “progressively remove” the
non-conforming measures 155 to address the non-application of national
treatment to existing non-conforming measures.156
Shen, a researcher of EU-China BIT negotiations, argues that China is
offering different degrees of national treatment protections to developed and
developing countries so as to attract foreign direct investment from
developed countries without reducing its discretion over national treatment
protection of foreign direct investment from investors of developing
countries.157 National treatment protection is provided to developing
countries if existing non-conforming measures can continue to operate.158
The China-Germany BIT, for example, offers such arrangements. The
Canada-China BIT signed in 2013, however, does not extend national
treatment protections to existing non-conforming measures without a soft
clause that declares the parties will strive to remove non-conforming
measures. 159 This soft form national treatment protection is not offered to
developing countries.
A possible explanation for the lack of investor-state arbitration
initiated by Chinese investors is that the majority of Chinese investors
economically and politically capable of investing in infrastructural projects
abroad are either Central Government-owned enterprises or other forms of
state-owned enterprises (“SOE”). Indeed, the BRI is led by Chinese SOE
investments. 160 It remains to be seen, however, whether SCIA’s, CIETAC’s

China-Malta
BIT],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/3368/download.
155
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Addendum s. 3, Ger.-China, Dec.
1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Germany-China BIT].
156
Id. art. 3(1).
157
Shen, supra note 149, at 810.
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Id.
159
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 8, Can.-China, Sept. 9 2012
[hereinafter
Canada–China
BIT],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/3476/download.
160
Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal
Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12, 17 (2016).
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and BAC’s investment arbitration rules will become popular among Chinese
investors, and whether foreign host states will be more receptive to Chinese
investment arbitration rules than the delocalized ICSID arbitration or ad-hoc
investment arbitration administered under the UNCITRAL Rules. For these
reasons, the effectiveness of arb-med has not been tested in the area of
investor-state arbitration in China.
In contrast, while weak due process safeguards in arb-med are a
pervasive problem, the popularity of Chinese arbitration institutions among
Chinese arbitration parties is not suffering. International users embrace more
outward-facing institutions, and many non-mainland Chinese practitioners
and scholars are involved in the administration of these institutions. The
reasons are two-fold.
First, due process protection is mostly dependent on standards and not
safeguards. Larger institutions such as CIETAC, SCIA and BAC are
motivated to conduct impartial arbitration not by laws and regulations but by
market pressures, both internal and external. As long as market pressures
continue to propel leading institutions to align the Chinese sense of
mediation with international standards, due process should not pose an issue
for Chinese arbitration. It remains to be seen whether foreign enterprises and
investors would prefer a seat of arbitration with greater due process
safeguards in the region (such as Hong Kong and Singapore) given the
increased competition in dispute resolution brought about by China’s BRI
development.
Second, whether Chinese institutions can attract foreign parties
depends on whether China can shape dispute resolution norms within the
BRI. Unlike China’s attempts to amend its laws so that local standards meet
international standards, norm shaping under the BRI entails the shaping of
international arbitration expectations to meet Chinese expectations—so that
potential parties are more receptive to the concept of Chinese arb-med.
Indeed, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. When making
assessments on what China should do to promote arb-med under the BRI
context, however, regard should be had for China’s economic and cultural
role in the region, as well as its motivations for supporting the BRI.
In conclusion, for investment arbitration, Chinese and foreign
investors are still reluctant to use formal investor-state arbitration in China to
assert their interests. As such, to the author’s knowledge, there is no
published doctrinal or empirical study of arb-med in the investor-state
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arbitration field. Informal channels of dispute resolution through diplomacy
and negotiation may continue to yield better results in China-related
investment disputes.
B.

Recent Judicial Policy

The Chinese government has always encouraged arb-med, whether in
domestic or cross-border arbitration. Requiring arbitration institutions to
provide a mediation procedure in the Chinese Arbitration Law shows
legislative support for this position. But what about the present judicial
attitude toward the hybrid procedure?
For domestic arbitration, since 2018, the SPC has made it more
difficult for lower courts to set aside arbitral awards. The “pre-reporting
system,” which used to be exclusively applied to “foreign-related cases,”161
is now applied to arbitration conducted within China without foreign
elements.162 According to the new provisions, when first instance courts
have provisionally decided to declare a domestic arbitration agreement
invalid, by refusing to enforce or by vacating a domestic award, it must first
report such a decision to its superior provincial-level High People’s Court
(“HPC”). Only when the HPC agrees with the lower court’s finding can the
lower court render its decision. Special rules apply when decisions
invalidating arbitral awards are made on public policy grounds. In these
circumstances, the HPC must in turn report the case to the SPC. Only when
both the SPC and the HPC agree with the lower court’s findings can the
lower court render its decision to set aside the domestic arbitral award.163
This new judicial policy prevents lower courts from being overzealous
or becoming subject to local protectionism and corruption against domestic
awards obtained from outside the Chinese region. It also allows the SPC and
HPC to harmonize standards for setting aside awards nationally, as well as to
remove the unequal judicial treatment between domestic awards and awards
with a foreign element. For arb-med, due to procedural irregularities of the
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WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 14, 31.
Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu zhong cai si fa shen cha an jian bao he wen ti de you guan gui
ding (fa shi [2017] 21 hao) (最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定) (法释 [2017]
21号) [Relevant Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applications for
Verification of Arbitration Cases under Judicial Review] (Interpretation No. 21 of 2017) art. 2(2) (issued by
the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), CLI.3.307538 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
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Chinese-style arb-med procedures, the pre-reporting system will cause
Chinese courts to more reluctantly set aside actually defective awards.
VI.

GLOBAL EXPERIENCES IN REGULATING ARB-MED

A.

East-West Perception Divide on Arb-Med

This section examines the East-West divide in how the state,
practitioners, and parties approach arb-med. Such differences are shaped by
the design of dispute resolution institutions, which are in turn the result of
how arb-med is perceived by these actors.
Caution is always needed when attempting to divide legal practices
into classifications such as the East-West dichotomy. The issue is simply the
one discussed above: excessively relying on stereotypes and tropes risks not
accounting for nuanced differences within each group and commonalities
across groups. The East is usually characterized by the communitarian
approach to dispute resolution or by the avoidance of social conflict.164
Accordingly, parties from the East prefer non-contentious dispute resolution
systems like mediation over litigation and arbitration. By contrast, Western
parties prefer legal certainty and believe that mediation does not necessarily
result in a fair and just outcome. They therefore prefer litigation and
arbitration over mediation.
These characterizations might hold some truth in domestic arbitration,
but they are increasingly irrelevant and untenable in the context of crossborder arbitration. In China, the drive to standardize arbitration norms
between “foreign-related arbitration” and “domestic arbitration” has made
the East-West divide less relevant, even for domestic arbitration. Such
attempts to standardize norms by the SPC include the abolition (in effect) of
the bifurcation between local arbitration commissions and foreign-related
arbitration commissions on arbitral jurisdiction and the most recent
extension of the “pre-reporting” system to domestic arbitrations. 165 With
respect to the “pre-reporting” system, as discussed above, it was applied
exclusively to foreign-related arbitrations conducted in China or entirely
foreign arbitrations conducted outside China to mitigate Chinese local
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protectionism concerns but have now been extended to pure domestic
arbitrations. 166 Chinese parties who might engage in cross-border arbitration
do not necessarily use Chinese lawyers or Chinese arbitrators. Hence, how
multinational companies choose their desired dispute resolution system may
be attributed to multiple legal traditions.
Further, legal practitioners and judges in the West are not as hostile to
arb-med as the stereotype suggests. In 2006, questionnaires were sent to a
sample of California judges who served in both trial-judge and settlementjudge capacities. The judges responded that, before trial, they would seek the
consent of the parties to set up a settlement conference in an attempt to
mediate the dispute without litigation. The effect of this procedure is akin to
arb-med, since if settlement fails, litigation would commence. 80% of the
respondent judges did not find pre-litigation settlement conferences
problematic, so long as the parties have consented to the hybrid
procedure. 167 But attempts at setting up regular settlement conferences are
not common. 168 On the specific issue of the judge expressing the merits of
the parties’ respective cases during the settlement stage in a failed
settlement, the respondent judges were divided on whether that should be a
cause for concern. 169 In these respects, the Western view is not consistent nor
unequivocal.
B.

Addressing Arb-Med Procedural Defects in the East and the West

1.

Asia

a.

Common Law Asia

Certain Asian jurisdictions rely on arbitration legislation to protect
against procedural irregularities. Arbitration laws in Hong Kong and
Singapore, the most preferred arbitral seats in Asia,170 require arb-med to
have proper procedural safeguards through provisions exclusively
addressing procedural irregularity. This is not so in China, where rules of
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individual arbitration institutions are the main instruments regulating arbmed procedures.
Arbitration legislation in Hong Kong and Singapore pays attention to
the conflict inherently faced by an arbitrator who later becomes the
mediator. Both Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance 171 and Singapore’s
International Arbitration Act (“IAA”) 172 allow an arbitrator to act as a
mediator if all parties consent in writing and no party has withdrawn its
consent in writing.173 Caucusing is also addressed by the statutes, which
reflects the concern in common law traditions over the confidentiality of
information provided to the neutral. Then-deputy president of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators Jeffery Elkinson, commenting on the Keeneye case,
argues that allowing the arbitrator to meet parties separately to try to reach a
settlement violates due process.174 When the mediation stage of arb-med
fails, the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance forces the neutral to disclose,
before arbitration resumes, any confidential information that is material to
the case given to her by a party during mediation.175 Singapore’s IAA
requires the same, in nearly identical language.176
b.

Civil Law Asia

Legislation on arb-med procedure is also found in civil law
jurisdictions in Asia. Like China, Japan is well known to be litigationadverse and Japanese prefer more amicable means of resolving disputes.
Japanese international commercial arbitration has not led to a vibrant market
of arbitration institutions as seen in China, 177 but where arbitration is used,
arb-med plays a significant role. The Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association (“JCAA”) studied its arbitration cases from 1999 to 2008 and
found that in 40% of the cases the tribunal had attempted arb-med, 178 out of
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which 52% of those cases were concluded by settlement, i.e., the successful
rate of arb-med attempts or those leading to consent awards could be as high
as 20.8%. Moreover, no party challenged the neutral on grounds of partiality
after arbitration had resumed in cases where mediation attempts failed.179
Japan’s Arbitration Law requires arbitrators to obtain consent from the
parties for mediation to take place.180 On top of that, the parties must consent
separately in writing in order for the arbitrator to attempt to mediate the
dispute.181 This regulatory approach might be described as a “doubleconsent” mechanism for arb-med to take place by the same person in Japan.
Such consent can be withdrawn at any stage of the arbitration. Unlike
statutes in Hong Kong and Singapore, Japan’s Arbitration Law does not have
much to say on the conduct of the arb-med neutral. Instead, institutional
rules have taken the initiative to set out the due process standards for arbmed. Japan’s Arbitration Law does not, for example, govern the
confidentiality of information given to the neutral during mediation.
Provisions governing this are found in the JCAA arbitration rules, which
forbid the neutral from caucusing without written consent from the parties
and impose a duty on the neutral to disclose at each instance that an ex parte
communication has occurred.182
As mentioned above, the Chinese Arbitration Law has remained
largely stagnant since its enactment in 1994. 183 Due process safeguards, such
as a requirement of separate consent allowing the same neutral to arbitrate
and mediate a dispute, are absent from China’s statute. Several leading
Chinese arbitration institutions are picking up these safeguard procedures,
albeit any indication whether such procedures will be adopted into law or
followed by other Chinese arbitration institutions remains absent.
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Singapore’s Unique Experience: The AMA Protocol

As previously discussed, even though the 2015 CIETAC Rules and the
2017 CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules allow parties to choose persons
other than the arbitrator to be their mediator for arb-med, this option appears
under-utilized by participating parties.
In this respect, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(“SIAC”) instead implements separation of arbitration and mediation by
regulatory and institutional design. In 2014, the SIAC and Singapore
International Mediation Centre (“SIMC”) launched an Arb-Med-Arb
Protocol (the “AMA Protocol”), where parties who enter into an arbitration
agreement can settle through the combination of arbitration and mediation.
Under the AMA Protocol, arbitration commences and is stayed normally for
a maximum of eight weeks while SIMC mediation is undertaken. If
mediation succeeds, the mediation settlement agreement is considered a
SIAC consent award and is enforceable under the New York Convention.184
If mediation fails, the parties resume arbitration at SIAC.185 Under the AMA
Protocol, arbitration and mediation are conducted independently by two
institutions, the SIAC and the SIMC, respectively, using arbitrators and
mediators appointed by the two institutions, also respectively.
The institutional partitioning provides parties a chance at amicable
settlement without the risk of being subject to the same neutral assuming the
conflicting roles of mediator and arbitrator. The drawback of institutional
partitioning is the additional expenditure of time, money, and resources.
When arb-med is performed under one roof, the time, costs, and resources
required to appoint mediators (or rather, turn arbitrators into mediators and
back) are less demanding.
Since the AMA Protocol was promulgated in 2014, the SIMC has seen
fourteen cases applying the scheme. 186 Among the fourteen cases, two cases
are still pending, two cases settled before mediation began, seven settled
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during mediation, and two progressed to arbitration.187 As of October 2018,
about one-fifth of SIMC’s caseload utilized the AMA Protocol, and as of
2017, the settlement rate was 85%. 188
Singapore’s AMA approach is quite unique but appropriate in
rejecting the integrated approach to arb-med, which, as demonstrated by
how arb-med is conducted in China, has serious defects and due process
concerns. But the question remains whether Chinese parties, who account
for most of the caseloads of Chinese arbitration institutions, are receptive to
such an institutional arrangement akin to Singapore’s. Another question is
whether Chinese parties are aware of the due process standards required
internationally and the due process concerns involved when seeking
overseas enforcement of consent awards. The Keeneye case may have given
Chinese arbitrators and parties a false sense of security. 189
2.

Continental Europe

Regulation of arb-med at the national level is scant in Continental
Europe, despite the popularity of arb-med in France, Switzerland, and
Germany. 190 Civil procedure legislation tends to address mediation during
litigation, but not arb-med. The arbitration provisions of the French Code of
Civil Procedure191 do not mention mediation in combination with arbitration
but do arrange for mediation during litigation.192 Likewise, the Swiss
Federal Civil Procedure Code only regulates mediation during litigation, but
not arb-med. 193
Germany’s Code of Civil Procedure, however, does mention arb-med.
Under Germany’s code, if parties settle a dispute via a mediation process
during arbitration, the arbitration proceedings end. If the parties so request,
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the arbitral tribunal “shall record the settlement in the form of an arbitral
award.”194 An empirical study by Bühring-Uhle, a German scholar of hybrid
dispute resolution used in international business, shows that German
practitioners support using the same neutral to conduct both stages of
mediation and arbitration. 195 The empirical study found that 86% of
respondents thought that facilitating a consensual solution is one of the
functions of the arbitral process.196 Most arb-med cases involving German
practitioners see members of the arbitral tribunal (often the chairperson)
playing the dual role of mediator.197 Such practice is consistent with German
court procedures, where judges may also act as mediators. 198 As such, this
practice stemming from a combination of litigation and mediation has made
German practitioners comfortable with the neutral being both the arbitrator
and the mediator.199
The German experience shows that judicial practices can affect the
willingness of practitioners to accept arb-med. The German judiciary’s
mediatory role is part of the court’s duty to settle disputes.200 It is therefore
not uncommon for an adjudicative neutral to subsequently “switch hats” and
take on a more conciliatory role. Further in line with common practices in
German courts, Bühring-Uhle’s survey participants were quite familiar with
this type of process and had very few objections to the involvement of the
arbitrator as mediator (and only 25% of German respondents thought this
was not appropriate). This stands in stark contrast to common-lawjurisdiction-based respondents who rarely encounter this practice (28 out of
31 have "practically never" seen it) and by a two-thirds majority regard it as
inappropriate.201
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On the contrary, arbitrators in France rarely become mediators in the
same dispute, even though the French Code of Civil Procedure does not
expressly bar such practice.202 Although French courts are empowered to
conduct mediation, 203 judges rarely mediate a case themselves.204
Applying the case study in Germany to China reveals that the
prevalence of judicial mediation could also be a factor contributing toward
the wide acceptance of arb-med in China. Judges regularly perform judicial
mediation as part of their duties. Arb-med would be considered even less
problematic compared to Germany due to China’s evaluative style of
mediation, which narrows the gap between the role the neutral plays in
arbitration and mediation.
3.

Common Law Jurisdictions in the “West”

Turning to common law jurisdictions, in the United States legislation
has not been keeping up with the rise in popularity of arb-med. 205 U.S. case
law is dismissive of an option to conduct hybrid arbitration and mediation.
In Advanced Bodycare Solutions v. Thione International, the Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a dispute resolution provision in a
commercial contract allowing parties the option to either mediate or arbitrate
was not “an agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy.” 206 The clause,
therefore, was not enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.207
In a similar vein, arb-med is not addressed in the English Arbitration
Act of 1996, which regulates arbitration in England and Wales and Northern
Ireland. 208 But English courts have considered issues of procedural
irregularity that might arise from having the same neutral assume arbitral
and mediatory roles in a dispute. In Glencot Development & Design v. Ben
Barrett & Son,209 the court held that the test to apply when assessing whether
the neutral had been biased was whether the “circumstances would lead a
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fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real
possibility, or a real danger . . . that the tribunal was biased.”210 The decision
in Glencot was ultimately held to be unenforceable, as the mere act of
caucusing in the mediation phase had compromised the neutral’s impartiality
and tainted his decision with apparent bias.
Among Western common law jurisdictions, Australia has considered
potential procedural pitfalls in its piecemeal reform of arbitration legislation
beginning as early as 2010. On the domestic arbitration front, Australian
states and territories have one by one adopted the Commercial Arbitration
Act (“CAA”) Model Bill of Australia.211 The CAA Model Bill sets out that
arbitrators can only be a mediator if the governing arbitration agreement
allows for this arrangement or if every party has consented to the neutral
switching hats.212 Moreover, party consent is also required for caucusing. In
addition, the neutral must treat as confidential any information obtained
from a party during caucusing, and, unless otherwise allowed by the
governing arbitration agreement, receive the disclosing party’s consent
before releasing information to the other party.
Perhaps most important is that the CAA Model Bill does not allow an
arbitrator-turned-mediator to act as an arbitrator again after a failed
mediation without first obtaining both parties’ written consent.213 This
arrangement is unique to the CAA Model Bill and not found in other
UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions like Hong Kong and Singapore. This
arb-med provision of the Australian Model Bill was tested in Ku-ring-gai
Council v. Ichor Constructions Pty Ltd most recently before the New South
Wales Supreme Court, 214 where implied consent from both parties was ruled
to be insufficient to meet the statute’s requirement that the neutral must seek
written consent before resuming arbitration after a failed mediation or where
mediation efforts are futile. 215
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Such an arb-med regulation regime is, however, not included in the
international arbitration regime in Australia. The Australian International
Arbitration Act (“IAA”) 216 governs international commercial arbitration in
Australia. The 2010 amendments to the IAA, whose main objective was to
incorporate the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law into the
Australian law, did not include an arb-med regime because there were
concerns that foreign courts would be reluctant to enforce an Australian
award concluded by arb-med. 217 However, as we have seen in the
experiences of China and other jurisdictions, arb-med awards are being
enforced by foreign courts. Furthermore, it is precisely for the reason that a
comprehensive statutory regime guiding international commercial arb-med
requires impartiality that awards may be enforced overseas.
VII. PROMOTING ARB-MED UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
A.

The Popularity and Credibility of Cross-Border Arb-Med

Before asking how China can promote arb-med under the BRI
context, we need to consider what the most valuable and least desirable
features of cross-border arb-med are to arbitration users. Then the question
is: what China could do to mitigate the shortcomings of arb-med and, in the
meantime, amplify its advantages as perceived by potential parties, not only
Chinese, but also those foreign parties alongside the BRI roadmap?
A recent survey conducted by Queen Mary University of London,
surveying mainly European private practitioners, in-house counsels, and
arbitrators, participants chose the costs involved as the least valuable
characteristic of cross-border arbitration. 218 Only 3% of 922 respondents
regarded it as one of the “three most valuable characteristics of international
arbitration” while 67% regarded it as one of the “three worst characteristics
of international arbitration.”219 “Confidentiality and privacy” (36%) and
“neutrality” (25%) stood in the middle, while the “enforceability of awards”
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(64%) and “avoiding specific legal systems/national courts” (60%) were
chosen as the most valued characteristics. 220
The survey also asked respondents about the factors they contemplate
when choosing a seat of arbitration. The “general reputation and recognition
of the seat” is considered the most important factor, followed by “neutrality
and impartiality of the local legal system,” “national arbitration law[,]” and
“track record of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.”221
Despite being considered one of the worst qualities of cross-border
arbitration, cost was only regarded by about 5% of the respondents as one of
top four factors in choosing a seat.222
Compared to other leading arbitral seats and arbitration institutions in
the Asian region (i.e., the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
(“HKIAC”) in Hong Kong and SIAC in Singapore), leading Chinese
arbitration institutions such as CIETAC, BAC and SCIA are likely less
attractive to foreign parties than HKIAC and SIAC. As the results of the
Queen Mary survey reveal, Chinese arbitration institutions should improve
the neutrality and impartiality of their arb-med procedures and the
enforceability of their arb-med-produced consent awards. Although the
outcome of the Keeneye case may be an isolated one, a similar fact pattern
has not been tested in courts outside of Hong Kong. BRI jurisdictions may
not pay as much deference to a Chinese supervisory court opinion as did the
Hong Kong courts.
One suggestion is that Chinese courts may consider adopting stricter
standards over the exercise of their supervisory powers for arb-med awards
manifesting due process issues. Stricter standards would make arb-med more
popular and credible to potential arb-med users and practitioners as a dispute
resolution method. While actively supporting deficient arb-med practices
and making it more difficult for domestic arb-med awards to be set aside
through unanimous application of the “pre-reporting system” benefits
China’s overall arbitration enforcement record, Chinese courts are not
injecting confidence into foreign parties by alleviating Chinese-styled arbmed due process concerns. Arbitration users are still not seeing Chinese
courts as competent reviewers of arbitrator partiality when the arbitrator is

220
221
222

Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
Id.

162

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

also the mediator. Perception is important, as the Queen Mary survey shows
that “general reputation and recognition[,]” “neutrality and impartiality of
the local legal system[,]” and “national arbitration laws” are the most
important factors considered when parties select an arbitration seat,
regionally and internationally. 223 Arbitration users prefer a seat where the
formal arbitration legal structure is perceived to be impartial.224
B.

The CICC and the “One-Stop” Hybrid Dispute Resolution Platform

Most recently, China’s Central Government, the State Council,
released in late June 2018 the “Opinion Concerning the Establishment of the
Belt and Road International Commercial Dispute Resolution Mechanism and
Institutions” (the “Mechanism and Institutions Opinion”).225 The Mechanism
and Institutions Opinion stresses the need to build dispute resolution
mechanisms and institutions that can account for the inconsistencies of law
and legal culture across the BRI jurisdictions. The solution suggested is a
“diversified” dispute resolution system to satisfy the range of disputes that
the BRI will produce. “Diversification” here is taken to mean the use of
mediation, arbitration, and litigation to resolve disputes.226 But studies below
show that the diversified dispute resolution mechanism may not necessarily
be conducted by the same institution (and same personnel) as in Chinesestyled arb-med practices.
1.

The Establishment of the CICC

The SPC established the CICC days after the Mechanism and
Institutions Opinion was published. The CICC is governed by the
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“Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the
Establishment of the International Commercial Court” (the “CICC
Provisions”). The CICC consists of two courts: the First CICC in Shenzhen,
Guangdong Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial
disputes arising out of the sea-based Maritime Silk Road (haishang
sichouzhilu 海上丝绸之路); and the Second CICC in Xi’an, Shaanxi
Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial disputes arising
out of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (sichouzhilu jingjingdai
丝绸之路经济带). Shenzhen was chosen for its traditional role as a test bed
of new legal and economic policies and for its strategic geo-economic
location on the Maritime Silk Road, as well as for being closer to the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Great Bay Area. 227 Xi’an was chosen for its
historical position as the starting point of the ancient Silk Road.228
Inspired by the SICC’s affiliation with the Singapore’s Court of
Appeal, the two new courts are permanent bodies within the SPC in
Beijing.229 Its judges are selected from senior judges familiar with
international laws and norms and proficient in English and Chinese. 230 As of
May 2019, all fourteen judges appointed to the CICC are mainland Chinese
and hold postgraduate degrees in law—with eight of the judges having either
visited or studied at a university outside mainland China. 231
According to Article 2 of the CICC Provisions, the CICC has
jurisdiction over:
(1) international commercial cases with the subject matter
worth more than RMB 300 million, where the parties have
agreed in writing to choose the International Commercial Court

227

Xiao Yu (于晓), Wei shen me zai shen zhen, xi’an she guo ji shang shi fa ting? Zui gao fa hui ying
(为什么在深圳、西安设国际商事法庭？最高法回应) [Why Establish the China International
Commercial Court (CICC) in Shenzhen and Xi’an? Response from the Supreme People’s Court], CHINA
NEWS NETWORK (June 28, 2018), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/06-28/8549700.shtml (China).
228
Id.
229
Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu she li guo ji shang shi fa ting ruo gan wen ti de gui ding (fa shi
[2018] 11 hao) (最高人民法院关于设立国际商事法庭若干问题的规定) (法释 [2018] 11号) [Provisions
of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of the International
Commercial Court] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 25, 2018, effective July 1, 2018), art. 1,
available at http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/210/817.html (China).
230
Id. art. 4.
231
See
Judges,
CHINA
INT’L
COMMERCIAL
COURT,
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/196/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).

164

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

for adjudication in accordance with Article 34 of the Chinese
Civil Procedure Law (2017);
(2) first instance international commercial cases under the
jurisdiction of the Provincial High People’s Courts (HPC) that
the HPC deems it should be adjudicated by the SPC, and the
SPC has so permitted;
(3) first instance international commercial cases of national
significance;
(4) applications for arbitration preservation measures under
Article 14 of the CICC Provisions and applications to revoke or
enforce an award from an international commercial arbitration;
and
(5) any other international commercial cases the SPC deems the
CICC should have jurisdiction over.232
Article 3 then prescribes the scope of “international commercial
cases” where:
(1) at least one party has a non-Chinese nationality, has no
nationality, is a foreign enterprise or organization;
(2) at least one party habitually reside outside of the People’s
Republic of China;
(3) the subject matter is outside of the People’s Republic of
China; or
(4) the legal fact of creation, amendment or extinguishment of
the commercial relationship occurred outside the People’s
Republic of China. 233
In short, the CICC handles complex international commercial cases
but does not extend its jurisdiction to investor-state investment disputes.
This is because of an early SPC interpretation of China’s reservation in its
accession to the New York Convention in 1986.234 However, according to
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CICC Justice Gao Xiaoli, China’s reservation may be reconsidered in the
future.235
2.

The CICC’s “One-Stop” Hybrid Dispute Resolution Platform

For arb-med, the most important CICC provisions are Articles 11 and
14. Article 11 formulates the establishment of a new “one-stop” international
commercial dispute resolution mechanism as follows:
The Supreme People’s Court will set up an International
Commercial Expert Committee (ICEC) and select qualified
international
commercial
mediation institutions
and
international commercial arbitration institutions to build up
together with the CICC a “one-stop” international commercial
dispute resolution platform on which mediation, arbitration, and
litigation are efficiently linked.
The International Commercial Court supports parties to
settle their international commercial disputes by choosing the
approach they consider appropriate through the dispute
resolution platform on which mediation, arbitration and
litigation are efficiently linked.
Article 14 then links the CICC with international commercial
arbitration institutions:
Where parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration by an
international commercial arbitration institution under Article 11
paragraph 1 of the CICC Provisions, they may apply to the
CICC for a ruling on the preservation of property, evidence or
conduct before or after the arbitration proceeding commences.
Where a party makes an application to the CICC for
setting aside or enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by an
international commercial arbitration institution under Article 11
paragraph 1 of the CICC Provisions, the CICC shall review the

(最高人民法院关于执行我国加入的《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》的通知) (法(经)发 [1987] 5号)
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 10,
1987, effective Apr. 10, 1987), art. 2, CLI.3.3255 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
235
He & Yan, Creating the International Commercial Court, supra note 49.

166

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

application in accordance with provisions of the Chinese Civil
Procedure Law and other related legal provisions.236
Pursuant to Article 11, CICC now allows international commercial
disputes to be mediated and arbitrated through a single, combined set of
procedures. The single platform does not imply that mediation and
arbitration is to be conducted by the same personnel or institution, as in
traditional Chinese-styled arb-med. Rather, by pointing international
arbitration and mediation conducted under the CICC to different arbitration
institutions and mediation institutions, 237 Article 11 seems to suggest that
mediation and arbitration in arb-med procedures are to be conducted by
separate mediation and arbitration institutions. This creation of an integrated
mediation and arbitration platform using separate institutions is an important
feature of the CICC, and exhibits China’s innovation of providing a “onestop” hybrid dispute resolution platform that aims to alleviate due process
concerns in cross-border arb-med in the BRI dispute resolution context.
While detailed implementation rules are still under preparation, as
recent as December 2018, the CICC designated five Chinese arbitration
institutions and two mediation institutions to be part of its “one-stop”
integrated mediation and arbitration platform. 238
The five arbitration institutions designated by the CICC are all leading
Chinese arbitral institutions: CIETAC, SCIA, BAC, Shanghai International
Arbitration Center (“SHIAC”), 239 and China Maritime Arbitration
Commission (“CMAC”). 240 These institutions are considered the most
experienced, capable, and credible Chinese arbitration institutions handling
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cross-border arbitration cases,241 and are expected to be the forefront venues
in BRI-related arbitration. Parties to arbitration cases at one of the above
designated institutions may apply for recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards directly to the CICC, which is expected to significantly enhance the
quality of judicial review of awards from these five arbitral institutions.242
As the two CICCs are permanent bodies of the SPC, the scheme can be
understood as the SPC providing direct support and supervision over BRIrelated arbitration.
Likewise, the CICC has designated two of the most experienced
institutional mediation providers in China 243 to work with its “one-stop”
hybrid dispute resolution platform. 244 The two mediation institutions are the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”)
Mediation Center 245 and the Shanghai Commercial Mediation Center
(“SCMC”). 246 If all the Chinese legislative requirements on mediation are
satisfied, mediation settlement agreements reached at the two designated
Chinese mediation centers can be converted into CICC judicial settlement
agreements, or even judgments issued by the CICC.247
3.

Implications

The creation of all these new schemes signals a strong attempt by the
CICC to move away from conducting arbitration (or litigation) and
mediation under one roof and by the same neutral—the practice of which
foreign parties are skeptical due to procedural irregularities. The CICC’s
new efforts bear some resemblance to Singapore’s AMA Protocol. This is
particularly interesting given the BRI development, because alternative
approaches to cross-border disputes, such as mediation combined with
arbitration, are expected to rise exponentially where China is expected to

241

The arbitration institutions listed by CICC exclude those of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 4.
243
Again, the mediation institutions listed by CICC exclude those of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
244
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 2.
245
CCPIT Mediation Center is accessible at http://adr.ccpit.org/EN/Index/index.html.
246
SCMC is accessible at http://www.scmc.org.cn/.
247
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 3.
242

168

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

take the lead in streamlining BRI-related cross-border dispute resolution
processes.
Under the BRI context, China faces competition with two of the most
popular seats of arbitration in both the Asia-Pacific and the world: Hong
Kong and Singapore.248 As both the initiator of and the largest economy in
the BRI, China is in the unique position to shape future BRI arbitration
norms. There are early indications of China’s intention to assume a larger
role in BRI arbitration. The 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China (“CCCPC”) passed a key decision in 2014 during its Fourth
Plenum on “comprehensively advancing ruling the country in accordance
with law,” 249 in line with Xi Jinping’s then-new mantra of socialist rule of
law with Chinese characteristics. The decision includes a section on
“foreign-related legal work,” which among other things states that China
should “actively participate in the creation of international rules” 250 and
should “strengthen [its] voice and influence in international legal affairs, so
as to protect [its] sovereignty, security and developmental interests by legal
means.”251
Therefore, besides the need to attract foreign parties to compete with
regional institutions, China also needs to establish regional arbitration norms
with respect to the BRI. These needs are the leading factors pushing China
to look beyond legal-political factors.
As evidenced by the CICC’s most recent efforts, the shift to separate
mediation and arbitration into different institutions rather than prescribing
arb-med under one roof using the same neutral(s) may indicate that, where
disputes are not exclusively Chinese (i.e., cross-border commercial
disputes), China is willing to explore due-process-valued hybrid resolution
processes. While mediation is an essential part of the Chinese cultural
legacy, arb-med may not necessary be at the expense of justice and
impartiality. What the CICC’s “One-Stop” Platform sacrifices in comparison
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to traditional Chinese-styled arb-med, though, is the efficiency and lower
costs afforded by using a dual-role neutral. However, foreign parties seem
relatively less concerned with the cost of arbitration than Chinese domestic
parties. As argued, the need to attract foreign parties in addition to merely
Chinese ones and the pressure to compete in the BRI arbitration market
might be the primary factors in reducing a Chinese characteristic divide in
arb-med practices.
Indeed, the development of arbitration norms in China is
bidirectional—it involves both localized globalism and globalized
localism. 252 The former direction is well known, for it is frequently
highlighted in government documents as taking reference of foreign
experiences during arbitral reforms. The latter, where local norms are
transformed into international norms, is less known but increasing in regard,
especially in the context of BRI dispute resolution that is going to be
increasingly shaped by China.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While mediation is more culture-laden and jurisdiction-specific,
arbitration is more international due to the successful harmonization efforts
of the international legal instruments in the field. Arb-med traverses the
spheres of local and international norms and practices. With mediation as a
local product that may potentially go abroad when combined with
arbitration, arb-med encompasses significant international implications.
China should regulate arb-med in a way to reconcile local practices
(mediation) with international expectations (arbitration) under the BRI
dispute resolution context. In doing so, China should reform its arb-med
practices; mediation and arbitration procedures should be separated so as to
comply with international due process standards.
China’s proposed economic bloc, the BRI development, has the
potential to promote dispute resolution means with Chinese characteristics
such as arb-med. Parties to Chinese-style arb-med, based on cultural
harmony, procedural looseness, and outcome-orientation, might find their
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arb-med-produced awards will not be recognized nor enforced due to
Chinese arb-med’s failure to comply with internationally recognized due
process standards, like those of New York Convention. As such, in the end,
the promotion of a Chinese-styled hybrid commercial dispute resolution
system in which arb-med is essential comes down to the following question:
how crucial is it to address the due process defects of Chinese-styled arbmed in the eyes of Chinese legislators and regulators, arbitration institutions,
and potential parties, both Chinese and foreign?
Interestingly, the development of arb-med in China over the past
decade does not seem to indicate that due process issues are so pressing that
party familiarity and dispute resolution efficiency are to be subverted for
higher standards of impartiality, especially for Chinese domestic parties. It is
still too early to make conclusions on whether Chinese-styled arb-med with
its due process concerns will impede cross-border dispute resolution
processes under the BRI. However, as discussed, judging from the most
recent efforts of leading Chinese arbitration institution such as CIETAC,
BAC, and SCIA, it is evident that regulation of arb-med detaching the two
processes has become the trend when faced with international clients and the
need to compete with international arbitration institutions in the BRI dispute
resolution market.
Global comparative study of leading arbitration jurisdictions in the
East and the West shows a heightened awareness of arb-med due process
concerns. Among the jurisdictions surveyed, this article argues that
Singapore in Asia, Germany in the European Continent, and Australia in the
Pacific have already impacted reforms of arb-med systems by some of the
most influential Chinese arbitration institutions. Singapore’s AMA Protocol,
in particular, has already influenced the CICC’s recent “One-Stop” Multi-tier
Dispute Resolution Platform.
Both the establishment of the CICC and its publication of the “OneStop” Platform show an awareness of the procedural justice issues in the
hybrid dispute resolution trending globally, as well as a proper shift in the
quality of Chinese judicial mentality; both of which signal the acceptance of
further arb-med practice in the BRI dispute resolution context that China is
expected to spearhead. The CICC’s most recent actions show that leading
international arbitration norms and attracting foreign parties, in addition to
BRI-dispute-resolution-market pressures, are the main factors driving
Chinese regulators to look beyond sociopolitical imperatives and cultural
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boundaries. Moreover, as China is anticipated to spearhead the BRI
arbitration and dispute resolution system, Chinese arb-med will remain a
fluid area of localized globalism vis-à-vis globalized localism in China-led
BRI development.
Apart from separating mediation and arbitration procedures in arbmed, Chinese courts should also change what they consider to be a “proarbitration” judicial attitude. For many years, the Chinese courts have taken
a “pro-arbitration” judicial approach emphasizing the number of arbitral
awards enforced in China and overseas. The extension of the “pre-reporting”
system to China’s domestic arbitration regime has become a natural outcome
and would make numerous defective arb-med awards impossible to be set
aside. Equally, if not more, important is the quality of China’s arbitration
processes. The quality of judicial review over the arbitration process, i.e., the
real role that court systems play in supervising the arbitration process,
should be emphasized in reforms as an essential component of the “proarbitration” judicial attitude.
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